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Abstract 
 
The subprime crisis in the mid-2008 has resulted in failure of major financial institutions in many 
countries. Kirkpatrick (2009) pointed out that such problems were primarily due to information 
asymmetry in the banking industry where information about the banks’ exposure failed to reach 
the board and senior management. Therefore, good corporate governance practices are crucial for 
long-term survival of banking industry. The study examines the effect of board size and board 
composition on cost and profit efficiency of the commercial banks in Malaysia from 2000 to 
2009 by employing Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Next, the Tobit regression is utilized to 
determine the effect of board composition and board size on cost and profit efficiency by 
controlling for liquidity risk, bank size, non-performing loans ratio, return to equity, and ratio of 
equity to total assets. Results found that independent director is positively related to cost 
efficiency. This implies that independent directors provide an effective monitoring role in over 
sighting and evaluating the performance of management in the banking industry. The results of 
the present study suggested that board size does not influence cost and profit efficiency of the 
commercial banks in Malaysia. This is consistent with the studies by Adams and Mehran (2008) 
and Zulkafli and Samad (2007). Gender diversity is also found to have no significant effect on 
cost and profit efficiency of the commercial banks in Malaysia. This is likely due to the relatively 
lower percentage of female in the corporate boardroom.  
 
JEL classification: G21, D21, G30 
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 1.0 Introduction 
 
The subprime crisis in the mid-2008 has resulted in failure of major financial institutions in many 
countries. This was mainly due to poor risk management process as a result of weak corporate 
governance practices. Kirkpatrick (2009) pointed out that such problems were primarily due to 
information asymmetry in the banking industry where information about the banks’ exposure 
failed to reach the board and senior management. Therefore, good corporate governance practices 
are needed to ensure long-term survival of commercial banking industry.  
 
Corporate governance is a set of processes and customs that govern the relationship between the 
stakeholders of a company which includes corporate management, the board of directors, and 
shareholders. It aims to provide the route for easier performance management within the 
organization. Besides, it has been recognized by the Basel Committee (2006) as an essential tool 
in enhancing investors’ protection and confidence by contributing to a more proper functioning 
of the market economy and hence leads to further improvement in economic growth.  
 
In addition, corporate governance practices received considerable attention in Malaysia with the 
implementation of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in March 2000. 
Special emphasis had been given on the role of independent non-executive directors to oversight 
and evaluates management performance (Fama and Jensen 1983; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond 2006). In 2001, the Bursa Malaysia Revamped Listing 
Requirement (2001) states that at least one third of their board of directors must comprise of 
independent non-executive directors as part of the listing requirement. Continuous improvement 
in the corporate governance practices is witnessed with the revision of MCCG code in 2007. 
Besides, board composition in terms of qualification of directors and the role of independent 
directors in the audit committee being reviewed following the Budget 2008 announced by the 
Malaysian Prime Minister. This highlights the importance of corporate governance practices in 
ensuring continuous improvement in firms’ performance.  
 
Corporate governance in the banking industry is far more complex and differs from the non-
banking firms because the banking industry is highly regulated (Macey and O’hara 2003; Spong 
and Sullivan 2007; Andres and Vallelado 2008; Agoraki, Delis and Panagiotis 2009).  The 
management and board of directors of the banks are not only accountable for it owners but also to 
depositors, borrowers, shareholders, clients, bank and also regulators (Ciancanelli and Reyes-
Gonzalexz 2000; Pathan, Skully and Wickramanayake 2007).  According to Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) heavy regulations in the banking industry created an additional mechanism of 
corporate governance. This greatly reduced the effectiveness of the corporate governance in the 
banking industry and thus affects the bank’s performance. 
 
In addition, the role of the banking industry is essentially important in ensuring the smoothness of 
monetary policy transmission in the developing countries because it provides the main source of 
financing to businesses. In this context, banks act as the assets transformer in transforming the 
short-term liabilities in the form of deposits into long-term loans.  Therefore, the banking 
industry is highly leveraged and the mismatch resulted from the assets transformations may 
contribute to failure of banks as well as distort the creation of sound financial system in the 
country.   
 
Furthermore, it is always a concern of the bank’s regulators to prevent the effect of systematic 
risk in the banking industry. This is because failure of one bank creates a spillover effect to other 
banks and resulted in destabilization of the country’s economic system (Calomiris 2007). The 
effort to reduce systematic risk had resulted in conflict between the shareholders in wealth 
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 maximization and leads to new agency problem (Andres and Vallelado 2008). Consequently, 
corporate governance practices through board size, board composition, board diversity and 
leadership structure of the board may help to mitigate the problems of information asymmetry 
(Jensen 1993).  Therefore, board structure and board composition are critical in corporate 
governance analysis because it enhances investors’ protection and confidence which in turn help 
to improve firms’ performance. This is supported by Barth, Caprio and Nolle (2004).  
 
This study primarily examines the effect of board structure and board size on bank performances 
in Malaysia in terms of cost and profit efficiency for the period 2000 to 2009 using Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In the second stage of the analysis, Tobit regression is conducted 
to determine the effect of board composition and board size on cost and profit efficiency of these 
commercial banks. Gender diversity in the corporate boardroom is also included in the analysis 
of the commercial banks in Malaysia.  
 
This study complements the study of corporate governance and banks’ performance because most 
of the studies of bank performance are based on accounting ratio, namely return on assets and 
return on equity as well as Tobin’s Q (Simpson and Gleason 1999; Griffith, Fogelberg and 
Weeks 2002; Belkhir 2004; Adams and Mehran 2005; Sierra, Talmor and Wallace 2006; Pathan 
et al. 2007; Zulkafli and Samad 2007; Adams and Mehran 2008; Andres and Vallelado 2008; 
Tanna, Pasioura and Nnadi 2008; Agroki et al. 2009). According to Agoraki et al. (2009) bank 
efficiency as a measure of bank performance is relatively superior as compared to the financial 
ratio because it enables to take into account of the shortcoming associated with the evaluation of 
inventories and depreciation. Besides, the frontier analysis allows one to determine the efficient 
use of banks’ resources at a given level of outputs while achieving the corporate objectives of 
cost minimization and profit maximization.  
 
Section 2 discusses on the study of corporate governance on bank performance. Next, Section 3 
presents the methods in estimating the cost and profit efficiency and discusses on the Tobit 
regression used to examine the relationship between corporate governance and bank efficiency 
level. This is followed by the discussion of results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and 
highlights suggestions for future studies.  
 
 
2.0  Literature Review 
 
Section 2 outlines the review of literatures pertaining to the objective of the study. It is centered 
on the following board characteristics that may have impacts on the bank efficiency:  (i) gender 
diversity; (ii) board size; and (ii) independent directors.  
 
2.1 Gender Diversity  
The issues of women in the corporate boardroom have been an area of interest of various 
researchers in recent years as women in present day play a critical role in corporation in view of 
their contribution towards knowledge, creativity and problem solving skills.  According to 
Westphal and Milton (2000), and Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) women are important for 
corporations as they offered a fresh and various perspectives in problem solving. Besides, they 
are able to correct informational biases in strategy formulation. Another researcher, Kramer, 
Konrad, and Erkut (2006) also highlighted that female directors did put forward the interest of 
employees and firms’ stakeholders and such an input has significantly affected the firms’ 
performance. Similarly, Catalyst (2004) claimed that companies experience a better financial 
performance when there are high representations of women in top management teams. Erhardt, 
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 Werbel and Shrader (2003) and Catalyst (2004) explained that this is because heterogeneous 
group made a better innovative and creative business decision-making than homogenous group.  
 
The strengths of women are also brought up by Desvaux, Devillard-Hoellinger and Baumgarten 
(2007) who opined that gender diversity is an asset for corporate image because it helps to foster 
relationship between the company, its employees, its shareholders, and its customers. Likewise, 
Adams and Ferreira (2004) argued that diverse board is more effective as female directors tend to 
have lesser attendance problems in board meeting than male directors. Nishii, Gotte and Raver 
(2007) are also of the opinion that diversity in senior management could lead to adoption of 
diversity practices which in turn improve company’s effectiveness and performance.  
 
Carter et al. (2003) conducted a study on 638 public traded firms in Fortune 1,000 found that 
firms are having favorable financial ratios when there are high percentages of women 
involvement in corporations. Carter et al. (2003)’s findings are in line with the later study of 
Erhardt et al. (2003) on 127 US large companies. Besides, in a more recent study, Smith, Smith 
and Verner (2005) found a positive relationship on firm performance when women are added in 
top management. Likewise, the study of Bernardi, Bosco and Vassill (2006) found companies 
that appeared on “100 Best Companies to Work For” are generally consisted of high proportion 
of female directors. Such a finding of Bernardi, et al. (2006) is likely to imply the positive 
contribution of women in corporations. Similarly, the results of Francoeur, Labelle and Sinclair-
Desgagne (2008) showed that firms with high level representation of women do generate positive 
stock-market returns.  
 
On contrary, Bøhren and Strøm (2007) and Adams and Ferreira (2008) found firms perform 
poorer when the boards are more gender diversified. Such a finding could be explained by 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) who found that women are relatively more risk-averse in 
financial decision-making as compared to men. Besides, the study of Earley and Mosakowski 
(2000) revealed that heterogeneous group is not well performed. This is because group with 
diverse background have difficulties to work together in order to achieve a common 
understanding. Besides, Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996) also found that diverse groups are 
slower in taking action, making decisions and responding to the competitors’ initiatives. 
 
On the other hand, some studies for example Zahra and Stanton (1988), Shrader, Blackburn and 
Iles (1997) and Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2007) found no relationship between the presence 
of women on the corporate boardroom and the firm value. Likewise, Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy (2009) showed that diversity seems irrelevant to financial performance in Top 
Management Teams (TMTs) of Top 100 listed companies.  
 
The review of literature generally shows inconsistent results on the impacts of gender diversity 
and firms’ performance. All in all further research is needed to gain deeper insight into this area 
in view of the different opinions expressed by various researchers.  
 
2.2 Board size  
 
The review of literature shows inconclusive findings on the impacts of board size and firms’ 
performance.  According to Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), larger board size is suitable for 
complex firms that need greater advising requirements. Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) 
argued that larger board size is effective and better for corporate performance as it consists of 
wide range of skillful and knowledgeable expertise that could improve board’s decision. 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) further explained that with larger board size, it could 
lessen the CEO domination which in turn improves corporate performance.  
The Asian Business & Management Conference 2010 Osaka, Japan
580
  
The empirical research conducted by Eilon (1986) on 42 boards of US retailing firms found that 
non-failed firms tend to have larger boards as compared to failed firm. This implies that larger 
board tends to have longer corporate survival. In addition, the study of Kiel and Nicholson (2003) 
revealed a positive result when they explored the relationship between board size and corporate 
performance of those largest public listed companies in Australia. Similarly, using a sample of 
174 banks and savings-and-loan holding companies, the study of Belkhir (2008) revealed that 
board size is positively related to Tobin’s Q and return on assets. 
 
Adam and Mehran (2008) conducted their research using 35 large publicly traded BHCs banks 
over a period of 1959-1999. Their study found that there is no relationship between firm 
performance and board size. Likewise, Zulkafli and Samad (2007) found no relationship between 
board size and bank performance when they conducted a research on 107 listed banks from nine 
Asian countries. However, many studies in the literature also found a negative relationship 
between board size and measures of firm performance. These studies include: Jensen (1993), 
Yermack (1996), Huther (1997), Conyon and Peck (1998), Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells 
(1998), Mak and Kusnadi (2005), Pathan et al. (2007), Bennedsen, Kongsted and Nielsen (2008), 
Guest (2009) and O’Connell and Cramer (2010). In particular, a study conducted by Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) in Malaysia and Singapore on board size and firm performance found that board 
size and firm value in the two countries are inversely correlated. Similar results are also found in 
European countries, namely the UK, France, Netherlands, Denmark and Italy (Conyon and Peck 
1998), Finland (Eisenberg et al. 1998) and Ireland (O’Connell and Cramer 2010). Besides, the 
study of Yermack (1996) found that smaller boards produce favorable financial ratios in United 
States Public Corporations. Yermark (1996) argued that such a result can be interpreted as either 
smaller size of board brings positive corporate performance, or adjustment on board size is made 
in response to the past corporate performance. 
 
Other studies, for example, Pathan et al. (2007) also revealed a negative relationship between 
board size and banks’ performances in the Thai banking industry. In a similar vein, Huther 
(1997) asserted that larger board is correlated with higher cost which is one of the contributions 
towards ineffectiveness corporate performance. Eisenberg, et al. (1998) and Guest (2009) argued 
that when the board size becomes larger, it will increase communication and coordination 
problems among the board members, and consequently it will affect board’s management control. 
As oppose to Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) and Jensen (1993) argued that large board 
could lead to greater CEO control which reduces the board effectiveness. This is because when 
board size is large, board members are less likely to participate, communicate and commit in the 
board discussion.  
 
Overall, it can be seen that the number of directors (board size) that sit on the board should be 
appropriate in order to achieve company’s goal (good performance). The appropriateness is 
highly depending on the firm size. Pfeffer (1972) remarked that large company that require more 
external contracting relationship should keep the board large, so that the board consists of 
members that can deal with various sectors of external environment. Therefore, some researchers 
suggested that the number of board members should be optimal.  
 
2.3 Independent director  
 
The presence of independent non-executive directors on the corporate boardroom is likely to 
reduce agency problems as outline in Fama and Jensen (1983) as they enhance monitoring 
management’s decision, protecting interests of shareholders and other stakeholders, and 
safeguarding firms’ reputation. Likewise, according to Staikouras, Staikouras and Agoraki (2007) 
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 non-executive directors add value to firm by providing their expert knowledge and monitoring 
services. Similarly, the empirical evidence of Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein (1994) showed that 
board composition is essential when independent directors ratify decisions that have a direct 
effect on managerial well-being and overall firm performance. In the case of banking industry, 
Brickley and James (1987) found that the presence of independent director tend to reduce 
managerial consumption of perquisites which in turn improve bank performance. In line with the 
above, many studies (e.g. Baysinger and Butler 1985; Shivdasani 1993; Cotter, Shivdasani, and 
Zenner 1997; Pathan et al. 2007; Tanna et al. 2008; and Chuan, Hsiao and Chun 2009) also 
confirm the contribution of independent directors in enhancing firms’ value.  
 
Positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the bank board and 
performance is also found in Pathan et al. (2007). Likewise, Tanna et al. (2008) found that 
independent directors have been effective in monitoring and controlling managers. Such an 
action may lead to a positive impact on performance, stock return, credit ratings, and auditing.  
Besides, the study of Chuan et al. (2009) revealed that board independence plays a positive role 
on firms’ investment behavior and performance.  
 
On the other hand, citing three of the largest bankruptcies in the history of corporate America, 
namely, Enron Corp., WorldCom, Inc., and Global Crossing Ltd, Petra (2005) argued that the 
presence of outside directors alone fail to resolve the problems of deficiencies exposed in the 
corporate boardrooms as these companies also utilized outside directors on their boards. The 
remark of Petra (2005) is consistent with the earlier study conducted by Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) who found that there is no relationship between the percentage of outside directors and 
firm performance. Similarly Pi and Timme (1993) found that cost efficiency and return on assets 
are not associated significantly with the proportion of independent directors in commercial banks 
in the US.  
 
According to Petra (2005), the inclusion of outside directors may jeopardize the efficient 
operation of a board of director. This is because outside directors do not have sufficient exposure 
on daily activities of the firm because of their limited involvement with corporate activities. 
Other studies, as discussed in Haniffa and Hudaib (2006, p.1039) for example, Baysinger and 
Butler (1985), Demb and Neubauer (1992) and Goodstein, Gautum and Boeker (1994), also 
highlighted the weaknesses of high proportion of independent non-executive directors which 
include excessive monitoring and jeopardize companies as they may stifle strategic actions. In 
addition, the non-executive directors are accused for not being truly independence and may lack 
of the business knowledge and this may defeat the purpose of independent non-executive 
directors.  
 
Overall, the review of literature indicates that the presence of independent directors tends to 
safeguard the efficacy of supervision and advice in the operation of firm. Therefore, Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) pointed out that the independent directors should endow with knowledge, 
incentives, and abilities to mitigate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and insiders. 
However, Andres and Vallelado (2008) also stressed that an excessive proportion of independent 
directors may damage the advisory role of boards. This is because it may cause problems on 
coordinating, controlling and flexibility in decision making. Therefore, a negative relationship 
between presence of independent directors and firm performance could be observed (Bhagat and 
Black 2001).  
 
 
3.0  Methodology  
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 This study employs Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate the bank efficiency in 
Malaysia from year 2000 to 2009. This is a linear programming methods based on the concept of 
Pareto efficiency where the production frontier is used to estimate the efficiency of a particular 
firm (Casu and Molyneux 2003). This technique compares each bank’s studied with the “best 
practice” banks and each bank is known as the Decision Making Unit (DMU). The most efficient 
DMUs lie on the cost or production frontier and assigned with a score of “1”. Banks (DMUs) 
below the frontier are considered to be relatively inefficient as compared to the benchmark banks 
and will be given an efficiency score in between “1” and “0”.  
 
As compared to the econometric models of frontier analysis, DEA is relatively flexible because it 
does not require a priori functional specification of the unknown technology (Fukuyama 1993; 
Favero and Papi 1995). Therefore, the estimation of efficiency will not be subjected to possible 
misspecification of the production function (Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey 1998; Jemric 
and Vujcic 2002; Okuda and Hashimoto 2004). Besides, DEA is superior as compared to 
econometrics models because it is best used for small samples estimations. The cost efficiency 
for bank j can be expressed as follows: 
 (1) 
where: 
CEj = cost efficiency of the jth DMU 
 = nth output of the jth DMU 
= nth undesirable output of the kth DMU 
= mth input price of the jth DMU 
 = mth input of the jth DMU 
 
 
The cost efficiency for the jth bank is given by the ratio of minimum costs to actual costs can be 
estimated using Equation 2 below. 
 (2) 
 
where: 
= technical efficiency of jth DMU 
= mth input of the jth DMU (calculated by linear programming) 
 
In this context, the banks are said to use mth unit of input in their production of nth unit of output.  
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 Next, the alternative profit function with the assumption that banks to have certain control over 
their output prices in the imperfect competitive environment is employed in this study. Profit 
efficiency represents a better concept of the firm’s objectives because it takes into account of 
both cost of production and revenues generated by the banks. The alternative profit efficiency for 
bank j can be expressed as follows: 
 (3) 
where: 
PEj = cost efficiency of the jth DMU 
 = Revenue efficiency for jth DMU 
 = nth output of the jth DMU 
= mth input price of the jth DMU 
 = mth input of the jth DMU 
 
The alternative profit for bank jth is given by: 
                                                                           (4) 
 
The above equations follow constant return to scale (CRS) that assumes the production takes 
place in the linearly scale the inputs and outputs without changing the efficiency level. 
Nevertheless, in the real economic situation firms may not be able to scale their factors of 
productions and outputs linearly. Therefore the approach of variable return to scale (VRS) 
estimation by setting  provides a better representation for both cost and profit function.  
 
Next, Tobit regression is employed to determine the effect of board structure and board size on 
cost and profit efficiency of the commercial banks. The bank size, liquidity risk, ratio of non-
performing loans to gross loans, return on average assets, return on average equity, and equity to 
capital ratio are employed as the control variables for cost and profit efficiency in this present 
study. The Tobit regression estimation is shown in Equation (5). 
 
                   (5) 
 
Where refers to average cost and profit efficiency scores of commercial bank i at time 
period t. 
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BSjt = board size (natural logarithm of total number of directors) for bank i at time t 
IDij = independent director/ total number of directors for bank i at time t 
GDij = total of women directors/ total number of directors for bank i at time t 
LReit = liquidity risk for bank i at time t 
Sizeit = bank size (natural logarithm of total assets) for bank i at time t 
NPLit = non-performing loan to total assets for bank i at time t 
ROEjt = return on equity for bank i at time t 
ETAjt = equity to total assets for bank i at time t 
 = error-terms for bank i in at time t 
 
3.1 Data and Variables: 
 
The sample of this study consists of selected 19 commercial banks operating in Malaysia which 
includes both domestic and foreign commercial banks from period 2000 to 2009. The variables 
used in this study are extracted from various issues of report of commercial bank. The 
unbalanced panel data approach is used to estimate the relationship between board size and board 
composition with the commercial banks in Malaysia. The intermediation approach where the 
banks function as intermediary in collecting deposits from the savers and provides excess of 
funds to the investors is employed.  
 
The inputs vector employed in this study consists of labour, capital, and loanable funds.  The 
price of labour is calculated by dividing total personnel expenses (employees’ salaries and benefit 
expenses) with total assets of the bank. The price of physical capital is calculated by dividing 
total depreciation by total fixed assets. The price of loanable funds is calculated by dividing total 
interest expenses on deposits and non-deposit funds with total loanable funds. The inputs are 
used to produce financial outputs such as loans, investments, and off-balance sheet products. 
Hence, these three served as the output vectors for the traditional banking products of banks. 
Next, the price of outputs employed consists of price of loans, price of investments and the price 
of off-balance sheet activities. The price of loans is computed using interest income from loans to 
total loans whereas price of investments is the ratio of investment income to total investment. The 
price of off-balance sheet activities is taken as the ratio of non-interest income to total off-
balance sheet activities of the banks. The total costs consist of operating and financial costs and 
the net income before taxes is used as the proxy for banks’ profit. All outputs, costs and profits 
values are in RM million.  
 
In the second stage estimation of corporate governance practices on cost and profit efficiency, the 
independent variables employed are board size, number of independent directors, gender 
diversity while controlling for liquidity risk, bank size, non-performing loans ratio, return to 
assets, return to equity, and ratio of equity to total assets. The expected results are stated in Table 
1. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
4.0  Results and Discussion 
 
The results of cost and profit efficiency scores of the commercial banks in Malaysia from year 
2000 to 2009 are summarized in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
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 The summary statistics of the efficiency scores reveal that the commercial banks in Malaysia is 
relatively cost efficient with an average efficiency scores of 81.8% as compared to profit efficient 
with the reported efficiency score of 68%. The results indicate that the commercial banks on 
average could reduce their input mix by 18.2% given the same output level in order to be cost 
efficient. On the other hand, the input wasted on profit efficiency is greater and amounted to an 
average of 32%.  
 
Next, the estimated results of the relationship between board size and board composition with the 
cost and profit efficiency of the commercial banks in Malaysia is presented in Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
From Table 3, the results show that the board size does not influence the cost and profit 
efficiency of the commercial banks in Malaysia. This is supported by Adams and Mehran (2008) 
which found that banking firms’ performance in the U.S. does not significantly influenced by the 
board size. Similar results were found by Zulkafli and Samad (2007) on 107 listed banks in the 
Asian emerging markets.  
 
Next, results suggest that the percentage of independent director in the board is positively related 
to cost efficiency of the commercial banks in Malaysia and it is statistically significant at 5% 
significance level. This indicates that the role of independent director is successful in mitigating 
moral hazard behavior of managers to act in accordance with their own self interest. This 
contributes to higher banks’ performance in cost efficiency. Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
suggested that independent director in the board is useful because it resulted in fewer conflicts of 
interest with the managerial level and reduced cost incurred to manage the bank. Nevertheless, 
the percentage of independent director is not significant to influence the profit efficiency level of 
the commercial banks.  
 
On the other hand, gender diversity does not significantly affect the cost and profit efficiency of 
the commercial banks in Malaysia. This might due to relatively lower percentage of women in 
the board. The result is consistent with the earlier study done by Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy 
(2009) on the Top 100 listed companies in Malaysia that shows gender diversity is not relevant in 
determining the firm performance.  
 
Liquidity risk is found to be negatively related to cost and profit efficiency at 1% significance 
level. This indicates that the higher the liquidity risks the lower the cost and profit efficiency of 
the banks. As pointed out by Rao (2005) lower liquidity risk will result in higher cost and profit 
efficiency because it is less costly for the banks to handle liquid assets which are relatively lower 
in interest costs, transaction costs as well as lower storage and protection costs.  
 
Finally, the equity to capital asset ratio is found to be positively related to cost and profit 
efficiency level of the commercial banks in Malaysia. A higher equity to capital ratio indicates 
that banks resort to equity capital in financing the banking activities instead of using debt-
financing. This resulted in lower risk-taking propensity and lower cost of borrowing and leads to 
higher and profit efficiency. The study is inline with Demsetz, Saindenberg and Strahan (1996), 
Salas and Saurina (2003), Rao (2005) and Chang and Chiu (2006). 
 
5.0  Conclusion 
 
This study examined the effect of board size and board composition on cost and profit efficiency 
of the commercial banks in Malaysia from 2000 to 2009. The DEA is employed to estimate cost 
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 and profit efficiency scores of commercial banks in Malaysia. Next, the Tobit regression is 
utilized to determine the effect of board composition and board size on cost and profit efficiency 
of these commercial banks by controlling for liquidity risk, bank size, non-performing loans ratio, 
return to equity, and ratio of equity to total assets.  
 
The results of the present study suggested that board size does not influence cost and profit 
efficiency of the commercial banks in Malaysia. This is consistent with the studies by Adams and 
Mehran (2008) and Zulkafli and Samad (2007). Next, results found that independent director is 
positively related to cost efficiency. This implies that independent directors provide an effective 
monitoring role in over sighting and evaluating the performance of management in the banking 
industry. This is in line with the requirement of the MCCG on the role of independent directors to 
further improve the banking performances. Besides, the regulator should also continuously 
improve on the MCCG and provides more transparent rules and regulation in developing the role 
of independent directors to boost the efficiency level of the banking industry. Overall, the results 
of the present study on the effects of board independent on firms’ performance are consistent 
with the findings by Baysinger and Butler (1985), Shivdasani (1993), Cotter et al. (1997), Pathan 
et al. (2007) Tanna et al. (2008) and Chuan et al. (2009) on firms’ performance. However, it 
contradicts the findings of prior studies in Malaysia conducted by Abdullah and Nasir (2004), 
Rahman and Ali (2006), and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) which showed that independence non-
executive directors have not been performed the monitoring functions effectively.  
 
Nevertheless, gender diversity does not significantly influence the cost and profit efficiency of 
the commercial banks in Malaysia. This is likely due to the relatively lower percentage of female 
in the corporate boardroom. Furthermore, women may have also played a less critical role as 
compared to man in the male dominated corporate boardroom in the commercial bank in 
Malaysia. Hence, their contribution in terms of knowledge, creativity and problem solving skills 
may not have critically affected the efficiency of the banks.  Generally, such a result in this study 
is consistent with the studies by Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy (2009), Zahra and Stanton (1988) 
and Shrader et al. (1997) who found that the involvement of women in corporations does not 
affect firms’ performance. Even though the involvement of women in corporate boardroom does 
not affect firms’ performance, Malaysian government should encourage women to participate 
actively in corporations in order to promote better gender equality in the country.  As remarked 
by Koshal, Gupta and Koshal (1998, p. 18) “women represent a special talent pool; it is not only 
a matter of morality to treat women equal to male, it also makes good business sense to use this 
talented resources effectively”.  
 
It is acknowledged that the present study only covers the limited aspect of corporate governance 
such as board size and board independence on bank efficiency. To gain deeper insights, future 
studies may investigate other corporate governance mechanisms such as board competency, non-
duality role of CEO, independence of audit committee and competency of audit committee on 
their impacts of bank efficiency. It is also suggested the study to be replicated in other emerging 
markets as to observe their cross cultural effects and to examine whether the same general 
relationship holds. 
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 Table 1: Expected results of variables employed in the regression models 
 
Variable Expected result 
board size = Log(total number of directors) Positively related to bank efficiency if large board 
resulted in better monitoring and advising the 
management as well as facilitate the manager 
supervision. 
 
Negatively related to bank efficiency if large board 
resulted in coordination problems, control and 
flexibility in decision-making. 
Percentage independent directors = total 
number of independent directors to total 
number of board of directors 
Positively related to bank efficiency because it 
helps to mitigate agency problem and moral hazard 
by overseeing the executive and managing 
directors as well as act as a monitoring role to the 
banks management. 
 
Negatively related if large number of independent 
directors damage the advisory role of the boards.  
gender diversity = Total of female directors 
to total number of board of directors 
Positive relationship is expected if greater gender 
diversity contributed a fresh perspective in the 
corporate boardroom for their knowledge, 
creativity and problem solving skills. 
 
Negative relationship is expected when the gender 
diversity resulted in more complex management of 
the firms. 
liquidity risk Negative relationship is expected because greater 
risk reduces the banks to operate efficiently. 
bank size = log(total assets) Capture the possible cost advantages associated 
with size. Expected to have positive effect with 
bank efficiency level. 
non-performing loans ratio = total of non-
performing loans to total loans 
Control for assets quality. 
 
Negative relationship between non-performing 
loans to total loans and bank efficiency scores since 
lower asset quality causes banks to incur additional 
cost in managing the assets and hence reduction in 
profit.  
Return to equity = Net income to total 
equity 
The profitability ratio should be a positively related 
to bank efficiency because more efficient banks are 
said to generate greater profit earnings (Mester, 
1993).  
equity to total assets Control for the regulatory conditions.  
 
A negative relationship is expected when a lower 
ratio results from higher risk-taking propensity and 
leverage and thus, higher borrowing costs.  
A positive relationship is expected when regulators 
view a higher level of equity to reduce of future 
losses. 
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 Table 2: Descriptive statistics of average cost and profit efficiency score of commercial banks in 
Malaysia from 2000 to 2009 
 
Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
    
Mean 0.818 Mean 0.680 
Median 0.835 Median 0.831 
Mode 1.000 Mode 1.000 
Standard 
Deviation 0.148 
Standard 
Deviation 0.899 
Count 167 Count 167 
 
Table 3: Cost and profit efficiency estimation and its determinants 
 
Variable Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
Constant 0.452 
(0.118) 
[3.819]*** 
-0.094 
(0.586) 
[-0.161] 
Board size 0.066 
(0.046) 
[1.418] 
0.007 
(0.229) 
[0.032] 
Independent director 0.174 
(0.069) 
[2.534]** 
-0.188 
(0.339) 
[-0.554] 
Gender diversity -0.000 
(0.132) 
[0.001] 
-0.439 
(0.650) 
[-0.676] 
ROE 0.053 
(0.082) 
[0.654] 
0.456 
(0.406) 
[1.122] 
Liquidity risk -0.212 
(0.082) 
[2.586]*** 
-1.269 
(0.417) 
[-3.044]*** 
Bank size 0.008 
(0.009) 
[0.869] 
0.053 
(0.044) 
[1.217] 
Non-performing loans  0.180 
(0.142) 
[1.265] 
-0.103 
(0.699) 
[-0.148] 
Equity to capital  0.337 
(0.130) 
[2.596]*** 
2.011 
(0.659) 
[3.050]*** 
Sigma 0.137 
(0.007) 
[18.276]*** 
0.668 
(0.039) 
[17.291]*** 
Log Likelihood 95.310 -169.541 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 % level respectively. Standard errors in 
parentheses and z-statistics in [ ].  
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